This paper analyses the case-law of the European Court of Justice on the substantive scope of ne bis in idem in transnational cases and evaluates the findings in light of the different concepts of legal interests inherent in the concept of crime as a material notion. I argue that the application of the interpretation of the ECJ to crimes against collective interests is insufficiently justified. As a result, the interpretation of ne bis in idem based on material facts appears only partially correct and a sense of distrust seems to be cemented between member states creating obstacles to a successful reform of the principle. Part one attempts to defend that the reasoning put forward by the court lacks relevance and evaluates how this affects mutual trust. Part two analyses this interpretation in the light of different forms of legal interest. Part three examines how later case-law has tried to explain the problematic interpretation of early cases and its relationship with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The article will conclude by summarising the findings which may put into perspective the more general challenges of cooperation in criminal matters within the EU.
Introduction and goal of the research
This paper analyses the case-law of the European Court of Justice (the 'ECJ' or the 'Court') on the substantive scope of ne bis in idem in transnational cases and evaluates the findings in light of the different concepts of legal interests inherent in the concept of crime as a material notion. I argue that the application of the interpretation of the ECJ to crimes against collective interests is insufficiently justified. As a result, the interpretation of ne bis in idem based on material facts appears only partially correct and a sense of distrust seems to be cemented between member states creating obstacles to a successful reform of the principle.
Ne bis in idem essentially means the principle that no one shall be tried twice (commonly referred to as the criterion of 'bis') for the same acts (commonly referred to as the criterion of 'idem'). It is recognised as a fundamental (or in fact constitutional) principle or fundamental right by EU member states and can be found in a variety of international law instruments (for a useful overview in this regard see Conway 2003) .
Introducing a principle which bars prosecution in a member state based on a prior final judgment of the authorities of another member state (the 'transnational application' of the principle) is a uniquely European achievement, the only successful attempt to date. The central premise of this paper will be the problematic interpretation given by the ECJ to the criterion of idem in that transnational context on the basis of the flexible wording of Article 54 of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 (the 'CISA').
It follows that I am not interested in the interpretation of ne bis in idem in all its forms, in particular when confined to a single legal order (as a general principle of EU law or as a fundamental right), or with regards to all its elements. I will focus only on the idem criterion in the transnational context. Whether the 'same acts' are to be interpreted in a factual manner or on the basis of the identity of legal qualification is crucial in the transnational context. As opposed to a factual solution, the differences between legal qualifications of the same facts in different member states may lead to a very limited scope of the principle. Thus, the primary source of interpretative difficulties seemed to be at the outset the unclear text of Art. 54 CISA.
The Court correctly observed, throughout the case-law, that the environment of criminal law was (and remains) largely unharmonised and, in those circumstances, identical acts (at this point as an undefined concept) may be regulated differently by the member states. As Professor Mitsilegas highlighted, this problem was brought to the attention of the Court by the member states (Mitsilegas 2009: 149) .
It is characteristic to the case-law of the Court that the key terms used by the Court in its reasoning also had no available definition in EU law. There was no general definition of the terms 'act' or 'crime' in the sense of a definition similar to the provisions of the general The facts of the case of Van Straaten were very similar. Mr Van Straaten was convicted in the Netherlands for several crimes, and acquitted for the charge of drug trafficking, concerning substantial amounts of heroin, by a final sentence. The drugs formed part of a larger consignment of which he was in earlier possession in Italy, thus the question was raised whether the acts could be considered the same and whether Italy is barred from pursuing prosecution based on the prior sentence brought in the Netherlands Van Straaten, .
It is perhaps in light of the above lack of definition that AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer commenced his reasoning by stating as regards the interpretation of idem that 'the contingent nature of criminal law policies and the characteristics of criminal proceedings are not conducive to the creation of universally valid rules.' (Opinion in C-436/04, Van Esbroeck, para. 39) The meaning of idem could not be decided solely based on the wording of Art. 54 CISA either. Therefore, he turned to the objectives of the area of freedom, security and justice and the Schengen cooperation to find interpretative guidance.
In doing so, he observed three important reasons for rejecting an interpretation based on the identity of legal qualification: first, the importance of an extensive interpretation of safeguards to personal dignity; second, to respect the declared objective of Art. 54 CISA, which is to ensure freedom of movement for persons (also enshrined in Art. 2 TEU [now Art. 3 TFEU]); and third, to observe that the Schengen acquis was designed in essence to remove borders for both persons and goods. (Opinion in C-436/04, Van Esbroeck, para. 
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As regards personal dignity, the AG correctly grasped the essence of ne bis in idem in protecting the offender from the inhuman treatment represented by multiple prosecutions and punishment for the same offence (Opinion in C-436/04, Van Esbroeck, fn. 10).
Though it was not separately mentioned by the Court, this is also inherent in the effort to prevent ne bis in idem to be interpreted on the basis of merely textual differences in criminal statutes.
In relation to the freedom of movement of persons, the Court followed, with slight shifts in emphasis, every measure of the Opinion of the AG (Opinion in C-436/04, Van Esbroeck, para. 45). The core argument of the Court to support a factual interpretation of idem is set out in the judgment in Van Esbroeck Van Esbroeck, and was repeated verbatim in the judgment in Van Straaten Van Straaten, . For these reasons I bypass presenting the AG's opinion separately, and proceed directly to the reasoning of the judgments, delivered on the same day, as follows: '35. Because there is no harmonisation of national criminal laws, a criterion based on the legal classification of the acts or on the protected legal interest might create as many barriers to freedom of movement within the Schengen territory as there are penal systems in the Contracting States.
36. In those circumstances, the only relevant criterion for the application of Article 54 of the CISA is identity of the material acts, understood in the sense of the existence of a set of concrete circumstances which are inextricably linked together.' This reasoning was confirmed and heavily relied upon by the subsequent case-law (cf.
C-467/04, Gasparini and others, para. 54; C-288/05, Kretzinger, para. 33; C-367/05, Kraaijenbrink, para. 26).
According to the judgment, an interpretation of idem based on the identity of legal qualification ('the same acts' equals 'the same offense') would hamper the freedom of movement because of the lack of criminal law harmonisation in the EU Van Esbroeck, para. 35, Van Straaten, para. 47 ) and because of the differences which therefore remain between the criminal laws of the member states. The AG considered that such differences would create as many obstacles to the freedom of movement, as there are penal systems in Europe (Opinion in C-436/04, Van Esbroeck, para. 45). 
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The Court observed that these findings are further reinforced by the objective of Art. 54 CISA, 'which is to ensure that no one is prosecuted for the same acts in several 57; C-467/04, Gasparini and others, para. 27; C-297/07, Bourquain, para. 49).
The question of national borders was only briefly included by the AG in the Opinion.
Perhaps trumped by the already existing reasoning based on the freedom of movement it was not taken on board by the Court. It is nevertheless telling that besides the objective of the Schengen cooperation to remove borders, it was very hard to explain why the existence of national borders shall not be relevant to the interpretation of Art. 54 CISA. After all, import and export seemed, perhaps also to the AG, decidedly different crimes.
The Opinion in Van Esbroeck laconically stated that it 'is ludicrous to refer to import and export in a territory governed by a legal system which, in essence, is designed to remove borders for both persons and goods.' (Opinion in C-436/04, Van Esbroeck, para.
52) The AG quoted the argument of Brammertz who emphasised that there is no reason to divide import and export on the basis of a border which is not even physically presented in the ground (Opinion in C-436/04, Van Esbroeck, fn. 25).
II
Based on those arguments against the interpretation based on the identity of legal qualification , the Court concluded that the 'same acts' must in essence be interpreted as meaning the same set of material facts, which are inextricably linked together (C-436/04, Van Esbroeck, para. 38) in time, space and by their subject-matter (C-150/05, Van Straaten, paras. 47 and 53) and which therefore make up an inseparable whole (C-367/05, Kraaijenbrink, para. 28). It is essential to disregard, in the application of ne bis in idem, the differences in legal qualification and legal interest which exist between the criminal laws of the contracting states Van Straaten, paras. 47 and 53) .
Even though the ECJ must leave it to the national courts to decide whether the relevant conduct constituted the same set of material facts (C-436/04, Van Esbroeck, para. 
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38; C-150/05, Van Straaten, para. 52), given the facts of the first cases, the above argument of the Court alone raises obvious problems.
Specifically, the relevance of the core argument of the Court can be contested.
Relevance, in this context, shall mean that the premises on which the conclusion of the Court (the factual interpretation of idem) is based are all relevant in light of the case-file.
Only such premises seem to be able to support the truth-value of the conclusion.
The Court appears to have erred at least in asserting that, in the above cases, criminal law harmonisation was absent. Partly as a consequence, the judgments inaccurately suggest that the lack of harmonisation was the reason why the application of the criminal laws of the contracting states produced a different outcome (import on one side of the border and export on the other). Given that the Court should address the facts of the cases before it and give opinion on the meaning of Community law in light of those facts, if there can be other reasons for a different outcome in legal qualification in different member states, the ECJ did not correctly select this central premise of its core argument. It is apparent that the qualification in the contracting states as import and export was not different by virtue of a lack of harmonisation. Given the criminal laws of the member states and the extensive international legislation in this field, there is no way import and export could be harmonised to realise the same crime in terms of qualification.
The Court failed to adhere to the reality of the case-files at hand. It cannot be contested that in the field of criminal law in the EU there is a lack of harmonisation in perhaps the majority of cases. 'In those circumstances', this absence of harmonisation can bear relevance. It is plausible that if (and only if) ne bis in idem were interpreted on the basis of the identity of legal qualification, in certain circumstances one was to worry about the negative effects of that absence of harmonisation on the freedom of movement. But this was not the case here.
Subject to this assessment, the relevance of the Court's argument is prejudiced because we can indeed conceive of cases in which a set of material facts inextricably linked together realise multiple crimes yet where those crimes could never be 'harmonised' to a degree that they become identical. In lack of relevance, the Court's conclusion on the interpretation of idem is only true in the limited circumstances where the premises of the argument are also true. It is therefore to be accepted that in cases where the absence of law harmonisation is the reason of a different qualification, the material facts can provide a suitable lowest common denominator. In those circumstances the factual interpretation will eliminate from the evaluation any discrepancies resulting from different criminal policies of member states.
In trafficking cases however, such as in Van Esbroeck and Van Straaten, the reason for a different qualification in the different contracting states is something other than the absence of harmonisation. The Court failed to address the theoretical problem that arises here directly from the facts of the first cases. Its conclusions only follow from the limited premises taken for granted. It failed to explore the implications on the meaning of idem in a situation, where criminal authorities come to a different outcome, but not due to the absence of harmonisation. This is even more troublesome as the first references for preliminary ruling were precisely raised to obtain an answer to this question. Because of the irrelevance of the argument it appears that the conclusion of the Court lacks justification. The Court fell short of providing a clear explanation as to why the factual interpretation shall also apply in cases where harmonisation is in fact present and is in any case not the source of the different legal qualification.
There is room for a critical appraisal of the factual interpretation of ne bis in idem to trafficking cases. In fact, a broader underlying problem begins to emerge. It concerns the question whether there is a group of cases, characterised by common features, to which a different interpretation of ne bis in idem may be preferred. I will address this question in the following, Part 3 of this paper. 
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Prior to that it is necessary to discuss a second preliminary question: mutual trust.
Member states heavily contested the factual interpretation of the Court. In multiple cases they demanded, on the basis of the different legal interest, that ne bis in idem shall not apply (cf. the submissions of the Czech Government in C-436/04, Van Esbroeck, para. 26 and of the Spanish and German Governments in C-288/05, Kretzinger, para. 32). In such cases it is common to refer to member states' behaviour as distrustful (Janssens 2013: 143) .
However, the irrelevance of the central argument of the Court in favour of the factual interpretation, which is now binding, has certain implications to the extent of mutual trust inherent in the Schengen acquis. In order to assess the level of trust that can actually reasonably be expected from member states under such circumstances, it is necessary to revisit an earlier section of the case-law of the Court.
The problem beyond distrust
The ECJ based its interpretation of idem partly on mutual trust in both of the above In those circumstances, a critical approach is warranted to mutual trust and recognition along the lines already illuminated regarding the factual interpretation of idem. Mutual trust and recognition seem not to extend to cases in which harmonisation is not the source of the difference in legal qualification.
It cannot be contested that a direct disregard of the requirements following from Art. E -98 second decision was the defendant able to achieve that a question is referred to the ECJ for preliminary ruling.
However, the conclusion of the Court suggesting such a general mutual trust to exist between member states seems, subject to the above, flawed. According to the Court, mutual trust and recognition only exist due to the existence of Art. 54 CISA in a field of law characterised by the absence of law harmonisation. The judgment seems to ignore the fact that the different wording of criminal statutes is not the only reason why the acts realised by the same offender may be considered separate. What is compared is not (only and in all cases) the wording of criminal statutes, but the resulting qualification.
A fortiori it seems inaccurate to suggest that member states are distrustful in cases where they are suspicious about the factual interpretation of idem. The above described mutual trust does at all not seem to extend to cases where legal qualification differs due to reasons other than the absence of harmonisation. This restricted, implied mutual trust does not justify distrust in trafficking cases.
In the following part, I will attempt to provide a possible explanation for the relationship between the Court's general reasoning and the concepts of legal interest inherent in the criminal laws of the member states. This approach may provide an explanation also for why member states claim that the Court should have taken into consideration legal interests in the interpretation of ne bis in idem in such cases.
Material facts and crime as a material notion
Simply stated, the argument I wish to defend is that committed offences are not identified by the wording of the relevant criminal provisions. Their quantification should be based on their material content.
It appears that the Court was forced to consider the question of harmonisation as important. In interpreting Community concepts, the Court is essentially confined to Community law, unless it is otherwise specifically authorised to provide interpretation in the light of national law. Such authorisation was not present in the CISA or elsewhere. Based on the identity of the holder of the legal interest, it is ensured that the member states assert jurisdiction over the same instance of harm and substantively the same crime.
Therefore, in such cases the identity of material facts is likely to coincide with the identity of the carrier of the legal interest, whatever the formulation of the legal interest may be. It The member state, as a collective entity, is the carrier of the legal interest in cases of continuing transnational crime. It is (at least partially) in the interest of the entire society of a member state to repress the illegal trafficking of contraband into or from the state territory and to prevent the circulation thereof on the market. Similarly, it is in the interest of the entire society to preserve the member state's environment, to ensure budget incomes or to prevent money laundering. Collective interests appear to be relevant to a larger variety of crimes, including i.a. environmental crimes with effects across multiple member states, terrorist activities or large-scale cybercrimes against multiple (or joint) member state interests.
What distinguishes transnational crimes against collective legal interests is that the carriers whose legal interests are violated by the same material facts (the different member states) are not identical. Also in this case, the formulation of legal interests and criminal provisions may differ from member state to member state.
In light of the case-law, the conventional concept of jurisdiction in continuing transnational crimes appears to be superseded only because of the objectives of the Despite the definitive interpretation of ne bis in idem delivered by the ECJ, the concerns raised by van den Wyngaert and Stessens appear to still be present today. In Part 2.1. of this paper I mentioned that both case-law and scholarship maintain that ne bis in idem avoids a scenario in which the offender is prosecuted twice for the same acts on the account of having exercised the freedom of movement. Exactly the contrary seems to be true in case of crimes against collective interests.
It seems more accurate to say that the offender, committing crimes against collective interests, would in fact be enabled by the factual interpretation of ne bis in idem to commit crimes of the same nature in a sequence of member states he enters. Art. 54 CISA clears the path in front of the offender, thus allowing him to proceed from member state to member state with impunity, trusting in the applicability of ne bis in idem. 
Interpreting the early case-law: later-judgments and the CFR
It remains to focus on the later developments of the ECJ case-law and European legislation. Two aspects must be assessed: how the factual interpretation has fared under the circumstances of later cases before the Court; and how the fundamental right enshrined in Art. 50 CFR might influence future interpretation. In both respects, the emphasis is on how the Court attempted to refine the early interpretation of idem. The AG admitted that it lies at the heart of a domestic principle of ne bis in idem that society has 'one shot' at settling its accounts with the offender (Opinion in C-467/04, Gasparini and others, paras. 70-72). That is the essence of the double jeopardy rule which, it should be noted, only applies with full theoretical purity in cases confined to a single legal order governed by a uniform set of rules (Opinion in C-467/04, Gasparini and others, para.
The later case-law: the road to the CFR

72).
The transnational nature of Art. 54 CISA distinguishes it from the general principle of EC law and warrants a departure from its interpretation. In transnational cases she did not supersede the main interpretative basis of the earlier cases, only stated that the freedom of movement would be hollowed out, were the legal interest the factor determining the identity of acts. That led to the conclusion which essentially corresponded to the Van The reasoning of the AG was not accepted by the Court, which shows that the Court attributes even less relevance to the high level of safety in interpreting the principle. The Court concluded, based on an argument on mutual trust, that a time-bar shall also trigger the application of ne bis in idem Gasparini and others, . The reference to a high level of safety did not even come close to being extended to influence the general meaning of the same acts. The reasoning of the AG reinforces the idea of ne bis in idem as a free-standing, propriae naturae principle, a uniquely supranational concept within the Community (Opinion in C-467/04, Gasparini and others, para. 81). In that regard, the primary task of the ECJ within its 'hermeneutic monopoly', lacking legislative measures, is to give proper effect to the principle in the context in which it applies (Opinion in C-467/04, Gasparini and others, para. 80). Some reasoning can be supplied therefore to support that even in cases where a difference of qualification or the legal interests is not a result of the lack of harmonisation, ne bis in idem must receive that proper effect, which must be grounded in a uniform interpretation. 
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The main line of reasoning in Gasparini and others was later confirmed as an autonomous, supranational concept by the subsequent case-law (cf. C-288/05, Kretzinger, para. 29; C-261/09, Mantello, para. 39). The later case-law of the Court, before Art. 50 CFR became binding law in 2009, essentially maintained the earlier findings and even ascertained their individual implications in a variety of special circumstances.
Mr Kretzinger received multiple consignments of contraband foreign tobacco in one member state and imported the same tobacco into another member state and continued to be in possession of the same there. From the outset, he intended to transport the tobacco to a single final destination (the United Kingdom) through multiple member states. (C-288/05, Kretzinger, paras. 14-15) Apart from ascertaining the application of ne bis in idem regarding first decisions brought in absentia, the ECJ reaffirmed that national courts, when carrying out their assessment, must confine themselves to examining whether the relevant acts constitute a set of facts which are inextricably linked together in time, in space and by their subject-matter, and considerations based on the legal interest protected are not to be deemed relevant (C-288/05, Kretzinger, para. 34).
In Kraaijenbrink, the Court affirmed that even a chain of individual money laundering acts, relating to the proceeds of the same act of drug trafficking (C-367/05, Kraaijenbrink, paras. 13-14), may be considered the same acts where they proceed through the national borders. Thus, the Court itself verified that the complete identity of facts is not necessary to establish idem (C-367/05, Kraaijenbrink, para. 36). It also affirmed however that the unity of the mens rea alone does not suffice for an inextricable link where such a link otherwise does not follow from the material facts themselves (though it might strengthen the link between facts; C-367/05, Kraaijenbrink, para. 29).
In further cases closed before the CFR became binding in December 2009, the Court provided some details to the interpretation of idem, though the questions were aimed at essentially different points.
In Bourquain, the Court was presented with a case-file on an act of murder, thus the identity of material facts received less attention. The procedure essentially concerned the applicability of Art. 54 CISA subject to the enforcement requirement, where criminal proceedings instituted in a Contracting State against an accused whose trial for the same acts was finally disposed of in another Contracting State, even though, under the law of the State in which he was convicted, the sentence which was imposed on him could never have been enforced. The Court affirmed the applicability of the principle and the identity of the material facts did not stand in question (C-297/07, Bourquain, para. 53).
In the judgment in Mantello, the Court laid down that the interpretation of ne bis in idem under Art. 54 CISA extends to the rule contained in Article 3 (2) In essence, the core of the interpretation of the judgment in Van Esbroeck was carried through and further elaborated upon in the later cases, without a material restriction on the factual interpretation. In that respect the later case-law can be viewed as a bridge between the earlier cases and the case-law directly based on the CFR. A separate assessment of the latter will now follow.
Ne bis in idem as a fundamental right of the European Union
Art. 50 CFR introduced a fundamental right not to be tried or punished twice in criminal proceedings for the same criminal offence (the 'fundamental right') with the following wording:
'No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings for an offence for which he or she has already been finally acquitted or convicted within the Union in accordance with the law.' (emphasis added)
The CFR did not inherit the ambiguous expression 'the same acts' from CISA. Instead, it refers to 'an offence', which brings it closer to the wording of Article 4, Protocol 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the 'ECHR'). The departure from the wording of CISA could suggest that the fundamental right is to be interpreted on the basis of the identity of legal qualification. This would give the fundamental right a narrower scope and, Even if, in the future, the ECJ would later divert from that approach, the wording of Art. 50 CFR seems to be essentially linked to the fact that (as made clear by Art. 51(1) CFR) the CFR only applies in cases where member states are implementing Union law. It forwards the view, also argued elsewhere in the case-law on Art. 54 CISA (C-467/04, Gasparini and others, para. 154), that a concept closer to the identity of an offense can be accepted where its application is substantially confined to a single legal order.
It shall be noted in that regard that an interpretation based on the identity of legal qualification and the legal interest could also be supported by the fact that based on Art. 51(1) CFR, the fundamental right only applies where the member states are implementing Union law. This could be considered, as we have seen in other cases, indeed a single legal order. However, the conclusions of Åkerberg Fransson show that it is sufficient that the case falls within the broader ambit of secondary legislation, as the Swedish provisions on sanctions for VAT evasion did. As this broad nexus does not itself equate implementation with harmonisation, as would be required by the earlier case-law on ne bis in idem, it appears to be a weaker reason to divert from the earlier case-law.
In those circumstances it can be assumed with a degree of probability that the interpretation of Art. 50 CFR regarding the substantive scope of the provision in transnational cases, will follow the lines of the earlier case-law based on Art. 54 CISA.
In the latest cases before the ECJ, M and Spasic, the application of the factual The Court held that the mere payment of a fine by a person sentenced by the self-same decision of a court of a member state to a custodial sentence that has not been served is not sufficient to satisfy the enforcement condition (C-129/14 PPU, Spasic, para. 86).
Concluding remarks
In this paper, I examined the arguments raised by the ECJ in the process of developing a uniform interpretation of Art. 54 CISA. The Court opted in a sequence of cases to base the meaning of idem on the identity of a set of inextricably linked material facts. Despite the strong criticism this approach elicited from member states, it appears that those early findings of the Court will, also on the basis of Art. 50 CFR, continue to determine the substantive scope of ne bis in idem in transnational cases.
However, the analysis also concluded that the same case-law, despite the clear questions raised by the referring judges, assessed a theoretical problem different from the E -112 one arising from the facts. As a result, the core argument of the Court lacks the necessary relevance to support the conclusion that a factual interpretation is the most apt in all cases coming under the scope of ne bis in idem.
As a conclusion of Part 3, I suggested that the theoretical problem which should be addressed is the conceptual role of a distinction between different forms of legal interests protected by the criminal laws of the member states. The current factual interpretation appears, ceteris paribus, correct only in case of crimes against individual interests. Crimes against collective interests violate distinct interests of multiple carriers and are therefore considered as materially distinct crimes by national criminal laws. Subject to the above, a reform appears desirable. A broader discussion on the treatment of different crimes under ne bis in idem should precede the creation of the supranational provisions. This is something the procedure of integrating the Schengen acquis into Union law has definitely lacked. Only after those preliminary affairs have been dealt with, can individual dignity be properly weighed against the claim of member states for the right to punish. It is of foremost importance to clearly establish the competence of the European Union to make legislation based on which individual dignity, stemming from the EU legal order, may supersede the criminal laws of the member states in the vacuum of justification elaborated in this paper.
I restricted the objective of this paper to ascertaining the core problem around the factual interpretation of ne bis in idem. It perhaps deserves extensive further research to ascertain how the legal framework could and should be amended.
Parallel to the discussion on ne bis in idem, it is often asserted that general rules on jurisdiction in criminal matters at EU level could supersede the problem. Lifting the safeguard of ne bis in idem in case of offenders of crimes against collective values could be the other solution. As a serious limitation to the freedom ensured by the current interpretation, it is a less costly enhancement of criminal reaction than the adoption of additional measures to combat serious transnational criminality. Should member states decide to apply this option in the future, this must be spelled out in due legal form.
The accession of the EU to Protocol No 7 of the ECHR could be seen as an occasion to re-think how ne bis in idem should be interpreted in transnational cases in the EU. It is not likely though that the ECHR alone can solve the interpretative challenges in a transnational context. Ne bis in idem under the ECHR applies within a single national legal order and even so, as I attempted to highlight, the ECtHR itself adopted, in certain circumstances, the Van Esbroeck-doctrine.
In my view, ne bis in idem should remind us of the importance of taking a cautious approach to the development of complex Union concepts which are systematically opposed by member states. As we have seen in historical cases such as Solange, it pays to be suspicious where a distrustful attitude becomes common among member states. Acting upon that suspicion might yield the desired rewards of a progressive (or at least in-depth) discussion.
 The author is entering his second year as a full-time PhD candidate in 'Individual Person and Legal Protections' at the Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa (IT); email: m.nemedi@sssup.it. I am indebted to Giuseppe Martinico, Alberto di Martino, Leandro Mancano and Nasiya Daminova for the suggestions and constructive critique they gave on earlier versions of this paper. I In addition it shall be noted that Article 4 of Protocol No 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Article 14(7) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also use the expression 'an offence'. II The Opinion of the AG quotes Brammertz, S., 'Trafic de stupefiants et valeur internationale des jugements répressifs à la lumière de Schengen', Revue de droit pénal et de criminologie, November 1996, 1077-1078: 'Why regard trafficking between Eupen and Liège as a single criminal offence and divide trafficking between Eupen and Aix-la-Chapelle into two distinct acts on the basis of a border which is not physically represented on the ground?' (Opinion in C-436/04, Van Esbroeck, fn. 25) One might ask whether it would have made a difference if the border were physically represented on the ground. III The term 'carrier of the legal interest' follows the meaning of the commonly used term in German scholarship (Rechtsgutsträger). I borrowed the translation from Simester et al. (eds.) 2014: fn. 34, where further guidance can be found regarding the difficulties that characterise translating the relevant terms into the English language.
